

## On relevance of the peace culture concept in the study of ethnic relations on local levels

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### Abstract

Long-lasting peace is local rather than national or international phenomenon. Nevertheless, most influential analytical concepts of peace – *liberal/democratic peace* and *peace culture* – are designed in the fashion of methodological nationalism. Thus, the concept of peace culture is said ‘empirically inconsistent’ (De Rivera), since it is conditional on the existence of a global culture of peace. It is similar with the liberal peace concept, since liberalism is limited to most developed countries and contains some behavioral elements that are unfavorable to peace, such as competition and exclusion instead of solidarity (with the weak), and using of arms in some major international crises. The insularity of long-lasting peace has far-reaching implications, which are tackled in the first part of the paper. In the second part, cases of *peace enclaves* in some multiethnic (Croat-Serb) areas in Croatia in the first half of 1990s will be compared with similar places in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and India. In building up an explanatory framework, some elements of the analytical concept of peace culture must be applied as well. These are: gender equality, in particular women’s participation in politics, and sympathy for the weak. Some empirical findings from research in Croatia will corroborate the significance of these elements. Furthermore, the issue of the (in)consistency of the peace culture concept will be discussed in view of the fact that, according to peace culture research on national samples, just a few Western societies belong to the advanced “peace cultures”, whereas others, like for example USA, Britain or France, do not. In parallel, research in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and India shows that durable peace exists only in some multiethnic (local) communities. Arguably, the lack of some crucial elements of peace culture, such as sympathy for the weak and non-usage of arms in crisis situations, may be responsible for conflict-proneness in both international and local levels. In conclusion, two dominant systems of cultural masculinity (Hofstede) in the globe, i.e. the techno-economic and the ethno-religious masculinity, are unraveled as the major obstacles to the expansion of a peace culture.

### Introduction

Long-lasting peace is mainly a local phenomenon. Nevertheless, most influential analytical concepts of peace – *liberal/democratic peace* and *peace culture* – are designed in the fashion of methodological nationalism. This paper, in its first part, provides an evolutionary explanation of the meagerness of peace and its frailty in civilizations and most nation-states, respectively. In the second part, usefulness of the major concepts of peace will be discussed as regards their appliance in the study of multiethnic communities on local level. In the third part, some examples of preservation of interethnic peace will be given, mostly from research

in Croatia, for to illustrate the explanatory potential of the concept of peace culture. The main idea of the paper is that durable interethnic peace represents a variety of a peace culture.<sup>1</sup>

### The social evolution: small is peaceful, big is bellicose?

Research on the evolution of violence and warfare shows that peace prevailed in the Paleolithic, i.e. small scale societies, where occurrences of organized collective violence were rather sporadic (Gregor 1996; Cioffi-Revilla, 1996; Walker, 2001; Thorpe, 2003; Sapolsky 2006). Most important, however, is the assumption – shared by Darwinist- and humanist-oriented researchers alike – that war and peace are by no means natural phenomena. Rather, they are results of human choice (Gat, 2006: Ch. 1). Ultimately, the human free will determines variations of the occurrences of peace and violence, respectively. Also, causes of peace in primitive societies and in civilizations may be similar, although in the latter case durable peace is rare as a phenomenon. One such cause may be cultural in the terms of socialization, as most people in peaceful communities are accustomed to avoid escalation of conflicts into violence as much as they refrain from the usage of arms. This commitment to non-violence along with sympathy for the weak represents the basic propensity of a culture of peace, which will be discussed in this paper. Such propensity basically corresponds to Geert Hofstede's description of *cultural femininity*. In cultures with feminine traits men and women enjoy equal treatment and gender roles are fluid rather than strictly defined; more women participate in politics; people are oriented toward (other) people rather than things; competition is avoided and success is not an important value – moreover, people work to live rather than vice versa, i.e. live to work, etc. (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 132-158).

Here, I would argue that tendency toward gender equality and sympathy for the weak, as traits of cultural femininity, also foster likelihood for interethnic peace and tolerance. This interconnectedness I will elaborate later on the premise, accordingly, that roots of social or intra-ethnic peace and of interethnic peace are homologous. In this case, symbolic differences between groups, represented by particular ethnic identities and their historical narratives, are not taken as a pretext for collective mobilization and conflict with another group. This is so most likely because there are not, or not enough strong, inclinations to conflict and violence within each (ethnic) group.

Unfortunately, such a peace culture persists in smaller rather than larger societal units (cf. Boulding, 1999). In contrast to empires and nation-states, peaceful communities have no armies, as they have no need for the latter. Similarly, economic resources are not set up, or not primarily, for competitive reasons. In the end, big and small have different symbolic meanings. As Georges Dumézil revealed long time ago, the idea of big number(s), next to the ideas of omniscience and extraordinary physical force, constitute the myths of post-primitive, 'archaic'(Indo-European) societies (Dumézil, 1968). This idea of the trinity of power traces the path to the emergence of monotheism and imperialism, whose expansions into

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<sup>1</sup> In earlier articles on this topic (Katunarić, 2010a; Katunarić, 2010b), I was focused on explanation of the existence of "peace enclaves", i.e. places in Croatia, resided by Croats and Serbs, where peace has been preserved amid the spread of ethnic violence in their surroundings in the 1990s. In this paper, more attention will be given to general explanation of differences between micro- and macro-conditions for peace in multiethnic societies. The major reason for such general outlook is that empirical evidence on the roots of interethnic peace is far insufficient for to provide for explanation of why durable peace occurs only in some multiethnic communities.

surrounding areas was unthinkable without massive violence, i.e. warfare, in combination with brainwashing (cf. Crone, 1989).

Wars are waged between organized groups of men (Beaver et al., 2010) usually supported by most women in the respective communities (Moser, 2007). As a result of conquests due to the wars, organizational links are established between different, and previously autonomous, units (cf. Thorpe, 2003: 146). These links, again mostly through wars, can be disrupted and replaced by the new ones. This way, large-scale societies are created capable of waging wars within and outside of their territories.

Switching between peace and war also characterizes the politics of democratic societies. Although democratic polis in ancient Greece never waged wars against each other, they fought against non-democratic states (Weart, 1994). Likewise, although modern democracies do not fight against each other, they are engaged in wars in the periphery (Ravlo, Gleditsch and Dorussen, 2003). Thus, large-scale societies are constituted by massive and almost permanent violence. Of course, big must not always be a proxy for bellicosity, yet provided that some propensities typical of peace culture can eventually be incorporated into larger units. These propensities include the following tendencies: tendencies toward gender equality, refraining from using arms in conflicts, and support to the weak. Conversely, the lack of these tendencies, or their confinement within some local communities, may be responsible for high incidences of international and ethnic conflicts and also inefficacy of mature democracies in their efforts (or just pretensions?) of spreading ideas and practices of peace. Instead, it seems that leaderships of mature democracies are more eager to advance liberal or democratic peace. This idea of peace is devoid of some important elements of a culture of peace, primarily sympathy for the weak. On the other hand, leaderships of semi- and non-democratic countries suppress ethnic conflicts, as much as any form of political dissent, by employing coercion along with ethnic favoritism (cf. Ilorah, 2009).

#### The major concepts of peace and their relevance in the study of ethnic relations

In the next, two major concept of peace will briefly be presented and subsequently discussed as regards their applicability in the study of ethnic peace and tolerance on local level. Rationale of the *liberal peace* can be illustrated with the reversed *U-curve* (Mousseau, 2001; Walter, 2004; Olzak, 2006). The curve indicates that in autocratic regimes ethnic violence is relatively rare (due to the regimes' suppression of ethnic conflicts). In the period of transition to democracy, ethnic conflicts and violence increase dramatically (mostly due to the politics of ethnic mobilization); eventually, in (mature) democracies ethnic violence is said virtually disappears (thanks to the implementations of the policies of conflict management based on dialogue and compromises). Also, mature democracies, which are at the same time economically most developed countries, do not wage wars against each other. Accordingly, they are less inclined to use coercive power in solving internal conflicts (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999).

There are two difficulties with this concept of peace. One is its implication of linear evolutionism, as it takes for granted that contemporary societies follow a unique and natural

path of development toward free-market economy and liberal democracy. Also, the concept does not provide for an explanation as regards developmental failures of many countries.<sup>2</sup>

The other difficulty with the concept is its methodological nationalism design. It is applied to national samples without taking into account possible interdependence between developmental success of one group of countries and the failure of another group of countries. If further development of democracy is highly (positively) correlated with economic growth, and with decline of conflicts, respectively, then erratic economic developments, and crises that are inherent to such developments, may endanger outlooks for peace. Certainly, development must not be the only predictor of peace and violence, respectively. Nonetheless, the idea of liberal peace heavily depends on unreal outlooks for nearly equal development of various societies on the basis of competition in all spheres, including military.

The concept of *peace culture* has been initiated as a policy concept by UNESCO (Mayor, 1997; 2004). It has been figured out for to reconcile different political approaches to international relations and different cultures (of the member-countries) through the promotion of the principle of non-violence. In addressing this issue, one of the major protagonists of the holistic peace, Elise Boulding, acknowledged that the concept is not realistic, as it can be identified only in some, as she said, ‘beautiful’ primitive societies living in peace and harmony with nature. In the contemporary, highly developed societies such peace is insular, for ‘mostly in our very complex society, we discover pieces of peace culture’ (Boulding, 1999: 1). Furthermore, when the concept of peace culture has outgrown an analytical concept, one of the leading researchers, Joseph De Rivera, warned about the lack of realism as well as the empirical incoherence of the concept (De Rivera, 2004: 545-546). He reproves that a peace culture must be established globally for to exist locally, which is, of course, unrealistic. Instead, on the basis of his measurement of eight groups of indicators on national levels, he singled out six ‘relatively peaceful nations’. These are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland (De Rivera, 2004: 547). Obviously, this selection combines the tenets of liberal and peace culture. On the one hand, the high-ranked countries in terms of a peace culture belong to most developed countries. On the other hand, some developed countries, such as the U.S., Britain and France, are missing from the list. Analytically, thus, they are more bellicose than peaceful.

However, De Rivera does not employ his classification of the countries as an explanatory device for major political developments, including international crises and ethnic conflicts, least how the ‘relatively peaceful nations’ may serve as a blueprint to other nations. On the other hand, Johann Galtung, another leading protagonist of the holistic peace (Galtung, 1992; see also: Cashdan, 2001), advocates pluralistic and intercultural rather than developmental approach to peace. He does not maintain that the Western democracies are to be taken as a model for establishing peace in other parts of the world. Also, says Galtung, some non-Western cultures have established their own mechanisms of justice which have been proven as more efficient, and more benevolent alike, than contemporary Western cultures (Galtung, 2002: 60-61).

Still, the peace culture concept has some weaknesses as well. The liberal peace alike, it departs from the position of methodological nationalism. Besides, it is confined within a

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<sup>2</sup> Instead, circular “explanations” are given according to which underdeveloped countries are such because they have failed to implement instruments used in developed countries.

group of the Western countries, without explaining how these countries may serve as a model of peace development for other Western countries and other countries in the world. It is similar with the intercultural approach to peace, as it does not specify how a synthesis of peaceful elements of different cultures can be carried out outside, say, conferences gathering interculturalist intellectuals from different cultures, who easily understand and agree with each other, yet hardly so with hardliners among their compatriots.

Still, the pluralist setup of the holistic peace concept is advantageous to the evolutionism of liberal peace, insofar as the former does not depend on developmentalist assumptions of the (neo)liberal paradigm, although – which is a problem that cannot be further discussed here – the holistic peace, as an alternative concept, lacks an appropriate idea of the economic development (cf. Nederveen Pieterse, 2010). The holistic concept of a peace culture is based at least on one distinctive principle, which is the solidarity with the weak (across class, ethnic and other traditional boundaries). This element is seemingly counter-productive to the (neo)liberal paradigm.

However, the specificities of the culture of peace concept cannot analytically be applied to national level, save the global one, due to the fact that neither (ethnic) peace nor violence appear in the entirety of the respective countries. For this reason, I have applied the concept on local levels, i.e. some (peaceful) multiethnic communities. Before presenting empirical findings from Croatia, and some comparative cases alike, which may corroborate the validity of the peace culture concept, in the next I will expound arguments in favor of the understanding of peace as a gender issue.

#### Peace as the expression of cultural femininity

Similarly to De Rivera's 'relatively peaceful cultures', Hofstede discerned analytically the following countries possessing relatively most traits of the *cultural femininity*: Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Denmark, Slovenia, Costa Rica, Finland, Chile, Estonia, Portugal and Thailand (followed by Russia, Surinam, Guatemala, etc.; Croatia, Serbia and Iran, for example, are more on the feminine than the masculine part of the list) (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005: 132-158). In contrast to De Rivera, in Hofstede's rankings some Western and non-Western countries combined make for relatively "feminine cultures". In other words, the femininity is less dependent on development. This aspect brings Hofstede's account closer to the holistic peace concept. Nevertheless, it is questionable, similarly to De Rivera's analysis, whether the selection of relatively feminine cultures can be used as an explanatory device. If we take a closer look, we can see that peace indeed predominates in the first ten of the listed countries. The outlook for peace is deteriorated as we move upward (from Russia to Iran, for example). To be sure, Hofstede's measures indicate on the average tendencies among general populations in the respective countries, and not specifically the predilections of their elites. It is more important, however, that the ten countries are, De Rivera's selection alike, mono- rather than multiethnic. This means that as much as some 90 percent of the population in each country consists of an ethnically homogeneous majority, except in the case of Estonia (with its high percentage of Russians). In De Rivera's selection, let us remind, Canada and Switzerland are multiethnic. Yet, they are multiethnic in a more specific sense. Switzerland is a unique nation with different languages rather than nationalities (unlike Estonia, for example, although the legal position of the Russians is not defined yet). It is likewise with Canada, although nationalism among the Francophones is much stronger than among their counterparts in Switzerland.

In this case, therefore, the cultural femininity cannot be used as an account of ethnic tolerance and peace. Still, one can assume that feminine traits in these cultures, such as tendency toward gender equality and sympathy for the weak, may have facilitated peaceful solutions in the situations of crisis of intergroup relations, whether ethnic or some other, caused by social class, political, or religious cleavages. Here, in the first place I would like to elucidate relationships between stronger female influence in society, cultural femininity and preponderance of peace in multiethnic surroundings.

My first argument in this respect is that gender binarism, i.e. tendency to create or perpetuate sharp divisions between women and men in a society, and tendency toward violent conflicts as a practical accomplishment of cultural binarism – are homologous. Unlike sexual binarism/dimorphism serving to procreation and reproduction, gender binarism serves to strengthen many other hardened lines of divisions, including the ethnic ones. Besides, a great deal of empirical evidence shows a high correlation between sexist, racist and ethnic prejudices and discriminatory practices in a society (cf. Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989; Nagel, 1999). By the same token, warfare is symbolically fostered by a whole bunch of binary codes, including sharpened gender dichotomy (Iveković, 1993), for the sake of denigrating or annihilating others.

My second argument relates to the fact that increasing influence of women in collective decision-making, whether in traditional communities or in contemporary democratic parliaments, significantly reduces the risk of violence in the respective societies (Harling, 2004; Jayal, 2006; Caprioli, 2005; Melander, 2005; De Rivera, 2004). I maintain that this tendency represents a clear example of the most important consequence of the deconstruction of binarism, which is its transformation into pluralist repertoire of diversified gender (and intermediate) roles. Politically, the emancipation of women contributes to the replacement of the exclusive choice between two possibilities, based on pre-emptive beliefs, with multiple choices which entail rational decision-making varying with different issues rather than preconceptions.<sup>3</sup>

My next argument is rather speculative, as it aims to explain, at least partially, a fact for which there is no available empirical account so far. It is that a majority of women in warring countries or communities support violence (Moser, 2007).<sup>4</sup> In addition to conformism and in-group favoritism and solidarity, women's support may also represent a perverted effect of binarism. Arguably, binarism induces more frustration among women by preventing them to activate other than maternal and auxiliary roles. Hence, women in the conflict areas may find it easier, so to speak, to 'say farewell' to their men. Conversely, women may be more content with social arrangements in which they can display their 'male' qualities as well, which constitute the androgynous nature of every human being. Likewise, in such arrangements men

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<sup>3</sup> This does not mean, of course that democratic parliaments or their precursors in traditional communities with participating women cannot be polarized or antagonized around some issues, which also includes the possibility that men and women happen to be on opposite sides in some situations. Yet, such situations represent exemptions rather rule in democratic or quasi-democratic processes.

<sup>4</sup> Undoubtedly, in the wars of the former Yugoslavia, most women were on the side of most men in the respective nations, and their attitudes were also marked with resentments and chauvinisms. Nevertheless, in places, like "peace-enclaves", where local men declined to enter armed conflicts with men belonging to other nationalities, they were supported by most local women as well. Yet, the two contexts are not necessarily analogous. It is not only attitudes towards others, but also relations between men and women are different, as explained in the rest of this paragraph.

sympathize more with women than the socially weak. This way, a culture of peace is being emancipated from the culture of violence and its binary codes.

In sum, cultural femininity as well as a peace culture dismantles binarism in favor of multiple identities and manifold social and political choices. However, this is merely a hypothesis. The next and most serious task is to identify propensities toward peace and tolerance *in situ* by the means of empirical research. Unfortunately, research in this direction is lagging behind the theoretical interest.

#### Peaceful multiethnic communities: culture, associational links, contingencies

In the next, findings from different studies on peaceful multiethnic communities in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and India will be summarized and subsequently discussed in light of a peace culture as well as some other concepts with an aim at establishing possible interrelatedness between the concepts.

The main hypothesis in the Croatian case-study was formulated as follows: the trend towards gender equality is more strongly manifested in multiethnic areas which preserved peace and tolerance than multiethnic areas overwhelmed by ethnic violence in Croatia in 1990s (Katunarić, 2010). The analytical concept of peace culture was taken from De Rivera's study and as such readapted to the study of peace and conflict in six different multiethnic communities, three of which preserved peace and the other three were involved into conflict and violence. Data on education, sustainable development, respect for human rights, gender equality, tolerance, and propensity to (non)violence, have been analyzed comparatively. Results show that in all of these aspects, except education, significant statistical differences appear between peace and conflict communities. The findings are explained by two concepts – the peace culture and the path dependence. In the first case, propensities toward peace and cultural femininity, including ethnic tolerance, are put forward. In the second case, past experiences are put forward, i.e. the choices in favor of peace and war, respectively.<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the two approaches can be combined insofar as the past decisions might have had also been determined by propensities in terms of a culture of peace and a culture of violence, respectively.

Although it is true that 'in many societies women have a traditional peacemaking role' (Francis, 2010: 3), the impact of women on collective decision-making in favor of peace is difficult to establish empirically, as much as it is difficult to compare the Croatian case-study with other case-studies on peaceful multiethnic communities surrounded by ethnic violence, primarily because the other studies are made on the basis of some other theoretical approaches. For example, in a comparative study of peace and conflict areas in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, Katunarić and Banovac (2004) found that most decisive role in cities that preserved interethnic peace and tolerance was played by local political leaderships who refused to follow nationalistic agenda of the central/national political leaderships of the time. This is basically similar to the findings of the Croatian case-

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<sup>5</sup> For example, in the Second World War, after Ustasha (elite military section of the pro-Nazi Independent State of Croatia) units scorched a Serbian village from a peace area in 1990s, neighboring Croats provided shelters in their homes for Serb refugees. This event was implanted in the memory of generations of local Serbs, which may have had an impact on the decision of local Serbs in that area, in the beginning of the 1990s, not to join Serbs from conflict areas, i.e. those who rose up against newly elected Croatian government.

study, as local leaderships in this case also did not stick with the agenda of nationalistic leaderships (in Zagreb and Belgrade, respectively). However, in the former case, although accepting some tenets of peace culture (primarily for explaining long duration of interethnic peace in some areas<sup>6</sup>), researchers departed from a general theoretical approach, i.e. constructionism. The constructionist approach underlines, as noted in the introductory part of this paper, conflict and peace as socially constructed states (cf. Cederman, 2001: 142). Likewise, ethnic identities are fluid rather than fixed (Joireman, 2003: 54). Accordingly, political leaderships are basically autonomous in their decisions-makings as much as they are free to articulate (and propagate) their visions of the others.

Even though the study did not look for attitudes toward gender equality and toward the weak, two other qualities of a peace culture came to the fore in this case as well. One is the longevity of peace in those areas. The other quality is close cooperation ties between local governments and civil society associations. Especially, civic associations were cutting across ethnic lines, associating people from different ethnic groups, thus constituting concord organizations. This detail has also been registered in the Croatian case-study. I assume that peaceful multiethnic communities in other parts of Yugoslavia may also have possessed some qualities of peace culture, including stronger tendencies toward gender equality than populations in (more numerous) conflict areas in the 1990s.

The third and, admittedly, most advanced study on peaceful multiethnic communities surrounded by ethnic turmoil and violence is Ashotush Varshney's comparative study on peace and violence between Hindus and Muslims in six cities in India (Varshney, 2002). He found that the existence of strong associational (civil society) links (across dividing lines) – e.g. business clubs, trade-union organizations, cultural clubs, bottom-up social movements of lower social castes and of women – have succeeded to resist shock-waves (e.g. destruction of sacral objects, gossips with panic messages, political provocateurs, etc.) which triggered ethnic violence elsewhere in India. Eventually, concludes author, the preservation of the interethnic peace depends much more on civil society than government. In this respect, he highlights the role of Mahatma Gandhi who preferred mixed/concord Hindu-Muslim associations more than governmental institutions.

In the Indian case non-governmental concord organizations may be taken as an instance of peace culture, yet with a reservation. It is that in the Indian communities, and more so among Muslims than Hindus, women's influence on men's decision-making processes is rather small. Otherwise, India and Arab countries are placed on the masculine part in Hostede's femininity-masculinity scale. Yet, these patriarchal societies are not without modernizing processes which involve some elements of a peace culture as well. Probably, in Indian cities that preserved peace (Calicut, Lucknow and Surat, according to Varshney's selection), where the civil society scene is vivid, sources of modernizing processes along with fermentation of tendencies toward gender equality and some traits of cultural femininity may be comparatively stronger. Yet, although reasonable, this is still a speculative assumption and indeed controversial, in the first place because the civic associations are open to members of the upper much more than the lower social class (to be sure, the social exclusivity characterizes civic associations in Western countries too – cf. McFarland, Reuben, 2006). The social exclusivity of modernizing processes with the tendency toward gender equality being conformed within upper classes in the long run diminishes elements of cultural femininity,

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<sup>6</sup> Three peaceful multiethnic cities under scrutiny in the areas of former Yugoslavia – Pula in Croatia, Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovska Kamenica in Kosovo – were peaceful in the long past as well, as interlocutors among local leaders proudly pointed out in their talks with researchers.



primarily sympathy for the weak. The social elites will hardly cherish values of trans-class and trans-ethnic solidarity, for they see the social openness and the social inclusion as threatening pressures on their resources of wealth, power and privilege. Thus far, the tendency toward gender equality confined within the upper class reminds to the lifestyles of the late medieval European nobility. Such self-closure of the modernization processes hinders further waves of democratization as much as the development of a peace culture.

### Conclusions

Peace is not a constitutional element of civilizations. This is so probably because complex and large-scale societies, unlike simple societies, strengthen gender binarism and insensitivity to the weak. Ethnic violence can be seen as a variety of warfare that corroborates binarism and gender gap along with social ruthlessness. On the other hand, gender equality, and women's participation in politics in particular, and the sympathy for the weak, are essential propensities of a culture of peace, which contribute to outlooks for a durable peace and tolerance in multiethnic communities. Findings from research in Croatia corroborate this cultural aspect. However, the propensities for peace cannot be spread out broadly, since they are inconsistent with two predominant power-systems in the world based on cultural masculinity. One is the contemporary Western, techno-economic, masculinity. It is based on competition in virtually all spheres of social life, which eliminates losers more and more without compensations typical of the era of welfarism (the grand substitute for the maternal care). The other global power system is ethno-religious masculinity, i.e. Muslim, Hindu, Christian and other religions that celebrate male supremacy. Although the ethno-religious masculinity cherishes some forms of social solidarity, these social ties are bonding rather than bridging, based on authoritarianism and gender and other binarisms. Eventually, both patriarchal systems give rise to xenophobia. In the techno-economic masculinity, xenophobia is triggered mostly by a downward economic cycles, mostly because of the shortages of jobs and employment opportunities. In the ethno-religious masculinity, xenophobia is ingrained in its ideological makeup and is usually represented by a figure of an arch enemy, such as Christians for Muslim fundamentalists, and Muslims for Christian fundamentalists, respectively. At any rate, Huntington's *clash of civilizations* seems to become a fundamental perspective for the both masculinities, which is corroborated most effectively through permanent warfare.

Having thus exceeded the specific scope of this paper, i.e. the impact of a peace culture on multiethnic communities, let me add finally one more thought aiming at explaining broader significances of cultural masculinity and femininity, respectively. The cultural masculinity, which produces violence as its vital element, constitutes the major macro-social systems. Thus international military-political alliances, most contemporary nation-states, and global markets as the grounds of the world-wide economic warfare, inhibit possibilities for durable peace. In contrast, cultural femininity along with culture of peace constitutes mentality and practices of numerous communities in the world and just a few nation-states. This is certainly not a slant favorable to the establishment of a broader international or global peace. Even though world history and future global development must not necessarily end up with endless wars, where only a tiny portion of humanity might be able to protect itself from such a fate, the outlooks for spreading out a culture of peace are not great. This, of course, may be a topic for other conferences, yet not too many of them, I am afraid. The Grand Watch (owned by Newton's God) is ticking – equally for believers and non-believers – last minutes to the high noon of destruction, when with annihilation of (Hegelian) Something a new wave of Nothingness is anxiously waiting for its new expansion. Nations have experienced the tsunamis of Nothingness in the First and the Second World War, both of which were initiated

in the name of exclusive nations and races. Future wars might be fought in the name of exclusive “civilizations”, as families of particular nations or cultures, whether Western, Islamic or some other. Peace, on the other hand, cannot be spreading out on behalf of any particular unit, but only on behalf of all people(s).

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