Fourteen years ago, translating an anthology of Croatian contemporary poetry into Italian, the literary scholar Mladen Machiedo entitled it “Vicini ignoti” (1992). What he wrote about twentieth century literature still seems to be true, even now when analyses of the “social text” seem to provoke more interest than literary ones. What’s more, what Machiedo correctly perceived as lack of information of the Italian reader on one of the cultures found on the other side of the Adriatic has in recent years been extended to those who were previously quite well-informed about it. The breakup of Yugoslavia and the successive weakening of mutual ties among its former constituent parts have extended the situation of ignorance about contemporary social and cultural developments in the close neighbourhood to the entire South-Eastern European region.

The purpose of this essay is to provide information on the contemporary Croatian society to the Italian readership and interested readers elsewhere in the region and beyond. Last but not least, it is hoped that it will provide some guidance even to Croatian readers, many of whom are still perplexed by the speed and abruptness of the changes that have taken place in the so-called transitional period. The changes at stake can be described as interrelated and all-pervasive, and have generally brought about multiple risks and vulnerabilities to the communities in which they took place. The phenomenon of postsocialist “transition” has most frequently been described as bringing about radical and simultaneous political and economic as well as social change, and Croatian society has been no exception in this regard. The specificity of Croatian transition, as is the case with most other countries emerging in the process of Yugoslav succession, has been that some of the most profound changes it brought about took place in the conditions of war or in the conditions of immediate pre-war and post-war political authoritarianism.

It was in these conditions of extreme and multiple social crises that formerly “socially owned property” was privatized. In this process, the Yugoslav version of the socialist economy was replaced by an in essence archaic capitalist system, whose ideological basis has been described as an odd symbiosis of market absolutism and the perception of the ethno-national state as an unmistakable, almost divine entity
A “chaotic privatization” (Katunarić, 1996) built on this ideological premise unfolded against the backdrop of increasing anomy, and was further complicated by a general feeling of insecurity that a war situation entails. Likewise, the transition from a specific Yugoslav version of the single-party socialist system to a Western-style multi-party parliamentary democracy, dramatic by its very nature, took place in a context additionally burdened by pre-war tensions and political turbulences caused by a dramatic breakup of a multi-national federation.

In spite of all this, Croatian transition can be said to have revolved around the topics of market, privatization, nationalism and multi-party system (Katunarić, 1996). In a wider picture, this makes it comparable to and compatible with postsocialist transitions that have taken place elsewhere. The question that a researcher has to answer is how to describe the changes connected with the mentioned topics: they can be approached from a political, economic, or socio-cultural point of view. In this essay, we have opted for a socially and culturally informed approach, not only because it is characteristic of the perspectives of our academic disciplines, but also because it is becoming increasingly clear that social and cultural consequences of “transition” remain largely unaccounted for even after the “technical” change of political and economic systems has been successfully accomplished.

In the discourse of European high politics, reflected in the media discourse and through it translated into popular imagination, the key indicator of the completeness of changes accomplished in the postsocialist period has been the level of readiness of an individual country for integration into the European Union. Judged by this yardstick, the transition is now over at least for the eight former socialist countries that became part of the EU in 2004 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). The perceived general ability of these countries to function within the general political and economic framework of the EU has led some newsletters and journals devoted to the subject of transition to announce the end of “transitology”. What they see as the order of the day now is the need to approach social and cultural issues in these countries in a more profound way.

We would like to apply such an approach to Croatia, although it only became candidate for accession to the EU in 2005 and opened negotiations in 2006. In other words, according to EU accession criteria, expressed exclusively in political, economic and legal terms, Croatia could only now be said to be entering the phase of “mature transition”. In social terms, however, we would argue that the country is already past the transitional phase: its population is now exposed to a different kind of risks to those prevalent in the initial transitional period. At the beginning of the 1990s, the risks revolved around the fundamental “internal” issues of transformation of the type of ownership and the political system, the latter including a belated nation-building process and the war. In contrast with that, present-day risks can be said to be predominantly globalization-related.

Likewise, the new social arrangements, introduced by the initial tumultuous transitional changes, can now be said to have stabilized to such a degree that – in

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1 The political and economic criteria for accession of the former socialist countries to the EU were laid down already in 1993, by means of so-called Copenhagen criteria, relating to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, existence of the functioning market economy, and ability of the candidate country to take over the responsibilities of membership. The fourth criterion, requiring adjusting of the administrative and judiciary structures to fit the EU norms, so that the Copenhagen criteria can be successfully implemented, was added at the European Council meeting in Madrid in 1995. The progress of the postsocialist countries in “transition” has been judged on the basis of these criteria.
order for them to be changed – a new radical transformation would be in order, of the magnitude and abruptness similar to the one that changed the system at the beginning of the 1990s. What’s more, it can be said that the configurations of new social positions, identities and values were already firmly established at the end of the 1990s, when the new, post-war phase of Croatian transition began, with the initial larger entry of transnational corporate capital into the country and the beginning of the formalized process of European integration.² The division of society into winners (the new political and economic elites) and loosers (war veterans, industrial workers, women, young people, retired people), so extremely visible in the late 1990s, has continued in a somewhat milder form into the 21st century³, in which both categories have been exposed to a new set of risks, relating primarily to the integration of the country into the globalized economic system.

In the case of Croatia, therefore, a bit surprisingly in relation to the usual foci of “transitological” descriptions, the social transition can be said to have for better or worse been completed as the country awaits major changes that “mature transition” is about to bring mostly in political, economic and legal terms. It is not about the direction and presumable effects of the latter changes that we would want to write in this essay, but about the existing social constellations that precede them and that are bound to play a part in them. Furthermore, we would like to take a longer view and try to account for the ongoing processes of social transformation in more detail than usually allowed by the large brushstroke descriptions in political and media discourses of the country’s geographical and cultural identity, or its “communist” past.

Given the limitations of space, we are going to approach our topic from the standpoints of two sets of theories, one accounting for the historical and cultural roots of the present-day Croatia’s composite regional identity, and the other one for a wide background of the social transformations it has been experiencing over the last century and a half. In order to provide the interested reader with a glimpse of the complexity of multiple Croatian cultural identities and regional affiliations, we have decided to present a brief account of the pre-WWII theory of the “social development of the Croats”, put forth by Dinko Tomašić, an interdisciplinary social scientist whose texts were only rediscovered in Croatia at the beginning of the postsocialist

² Deutsche Telekom’s takeover of a significant package of shares of the Croatian national telecommunications system began in 1999. This was also the year of the German WAZ media corporation’s entry into the Croatian largest newspaper publishing house Europapress Holding. Likewise, European Union launched its Stabilisation and Association Process for five countries of the South-East European region in 1999. (Croatia and Macedonia were the first two of these countries to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreements in 2001). The privatization of the banking system, which eventually left over 90 % of the banks in foreign hands (predominantly Austrian, Italian and German), started somewhat earlier in the late 1990s.

³ The basic contours of the social arrangements brought about by transition can be said to have been already outlined in the mid-1990s by Katunarić (1996). Empirical verification of the worsening social position of women and young people can be found in Tomić-Koludrović and Kunac (2000) and Tomić-Koludrović and Leburić (2001). A recent article (Malenica, 2006) quotes data showing that Gini coefficient of inequality has been rather constant between the years 1995 and 2001. The same goes for the index of poverty between the years 1999 and 2003. To put things into perspective, one should remark, though, that the increase of poverty and social inequality in Croatia is stark only in comparison with the standards of social security the country enjoyed in the socialist period. According to newspaper reports (Vresnik, 2006), the recent World Bank survey has found out that Croatia has the lowest rate of absolute poverty among all the “transitional” countries in Central and East Europe.
period. On the other hand, we would like to try to account for the mixed character of Croatia’s present-day society and the nature of the changes it is currently experiencing by resorting to the theory of “first” and “second” (or “reflexive”) modernity, as proposed by Ulrich Beck and later on adopted in a slightly different form by Anthony Giddens. We argue that the Croatian situation is best understood if one describes its current “social development” in terms of a simultaneous evolvement of two modernization processes, which are different in their character and levels of intensity.

The reason why we have chosen to begin this section of the text with Tomašić’s historical account of the “social development” of the Croats is not only the interest his theories have provoked at the beginning of the 1990s, in light of their “non-existence” in the socialist period and also because they were seen by some as useful in interpreting the roots of the conflicts that took place in the wars of Yugoslav succession. We have chosen to open this section of the text with a reference to the works of this pre-WWII sociologist also because it is hard - in the context of post-WWII social science in Croatia - to find such a vivid interest for a sociologically relevant subject and such an intrinsically interdisciplinary approach to it. Because of this unfortunate absence, we feel that the elements of Tomašić’s “culturalist ethnosociology”, in spite of all the shortcomings particularly obvious from a historical distance, remain a good starting point for the discussion of the historical roots of internal conflicts still present in contemporary Croatian society, albeit under a different guise.

In his writings, Tomašić described what he saw as the dual model of Croatian culture in terms of a difference between the Slav agrarian cooperative model found in the northern, Panonian part of Croatia and the tribal culture of the cattle breeders living in the regions of the Dinara mountain range. According to Tomašić, who was quoting earlier researchers on the subject, the pattern of life of the traditional farming families was characterized by the socialization of peaceful personality in a less patriarchal context with an emotive upbringing. In this pattern of life, a special emphasis was put on social justice, i.e. protection of the weaker members of the community was highly valued. In contrast, the cultural model of the cattle-breeders led to a socialisation of an aggressive, self-imposing personality, and was generally characterized by patriarchal adoration of masculinity, cult of the mother and neglect for the needs of the wider community.

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4 Dinko Tomašić (1902-1975) is nowadays judged in Croatia to have been «our first modern sociologist» (Štulhofer, 1997). This graduate of law at the University of Zagreb was sent to Paris in 1929 to specialize in social psychology and anthropology and, between the years 1932 and 1935, also visited the leading U.S. departments of sociology (at Columbia University, University of Chicago and Berkley). Attacked by the Croatian right in the 1930s, he emigrated to the United States shortly before the outbreak of World War II, where from the 1950s to his death he taught at Indiana University. Since in this period he advocated the introduction of Western-style democracy into Tito's Yugoslavia, his work was completely neglected in the socialist times, only to experience a revival of interest in the postsocialist period.

5 A discussion of this sort can be said to have been started in the Croatian academic context by Štulhofer (1992). It found its most radical and internationally accessible version in Mestrović et al (1993). Unfortunately, the latter publication represents a highly disputable account of the subject-matter, characterized by “abusive ethnicisation” (Bougarel, 1998) to a much larger degree than can be said of Tomašić’s work published in the 1930s.

6 This is not the place to speculate on the reason of this absence, but it can be briefly accounted for by mentioning the dominance of the macro approaches (Marxist, neo-Marxist and partly structural-functionalist) and quantitative empirical research in the entire post-WWII period of Croatian sociology.

7 We find this Mitrović's (1981) designation, quoted by Štulhofer (1997) to be a useful description of the basic intention and profile of Tomašić's work.
Tomašić found the traces of the two models not only in the political life at the
time of writing of his works, but claimed that the entire Croatian history was
characterized by the conflict of democratic and authoritarian principles implicit in
these two ideal types. Using a more advanced theoretical vocabulary than his was, one
could say that Tomašić saw the elements of this conflict in terms of structures of long
duration resurfacing in contemporary political phenomena. And indeed, half a
century after the publication of his key pre-WWII works (reprints available in
Tomašić, 1997a, 1997b), it is fascinating to note how many of his descriptions of
mentalities and social relations could still be applied in analyses of contemporary
cultural and political events. However, in this essay, we would like to focus our
attention on how the elements of Tomašić’s work can help to better understand
multiple cultural identities found on the present-day territory of the Republic of
Croatia, as well as its multiple regional affiliations, recently most frequently simplified
in the political and journalistic discourses to a reductionist designation of the
“Western Balkans”.

The latter designation, although obviously considered useful from the viewpoint
of EU policy makers, meets unfavourably with the Croatian general public and indeed
underplays the cultural and historical complexities involved in any attempt to define
the territory in question from an intellectually more complex point of view. In terms of
its supranational identity, Croatia is namely no different from “most of the countries”
which also have “double, or even triple, regional identities” (Dragojević, 2001, 17).
What’s more, according to the same author, “with its Central European,
Mediterranean and South Eastern (not to say Balkan) identities” Croatia represents a
“very complex […] instance of the rule” (Dragojević, 2001, 17). Yet, after the breakup
of Yugoslavia left the media and political discourses without a handy reference to the
entire area of a disappeared state, it was largely supplanted by the mentioned
“Balkans” framework, not allowing any room for the complexities of cultural
identities found on the territory of what now is the Republic of Croatia.

To be sure, what general sentiment exists in Croatia against pigeon-holing the
country into the “Balkans” niche has not been motivated by complex discussions of
identity issues, but based on a feeling of historical belonging to a “European” cultural
and political space. The causes of this feeling can by no means be described by the use

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8 For instance, in his pre-WWII writings, Tomašić saw the ideology of the Croatian Peasant Party,
emphasizing social justice, as an inheritor of the principles of the traditional agrarian collectivist
communities. On the other hand, he claimed that the domination of tribal authority culminated in the
political power structures of the interwar Yugoslav state. It is interesting to note that he converged in
this estimate with the Serbian scholar Jovan Cvijić, but evaluated it differently (i.e. negatively).
Tomašić rejected theories of racial superiority in general and interpreted what Cvijić saw as
psychological traits of the “Dinara type” merely as (changeable) elements of the cultural organization
of the cattle-breeders and warriors living on the Dinara mountain range.

9 These resemblances extend from the structural position of the economy in semi-colonial conditions to
the position and behavior of intelligentsia and the political class. Tomašić presents these phenomena in
their historical continuity, which obviously extends to these days.

10 Other terms used to fill in the void created by the disappearance of the handy label of “Yugoslavia”
include “South-Eastern Europe”, “Adriatic-Ionian region”, or – as is the case with the title of the
present volume – “Europa Adriatica”. The use of every one of these terms clearly carries with it a geo-
political projection of the space in question, i.e. reflects the vision of the role envisaged for it by those
who use a particular term. The somewhat contradictory current status of the region can be illustrated by
the occasional concurrent and interchangeable use of the terms “South-Eastern Europe” and “Western
Balkans” within the same official EU document. In this contradictory context, the case of Croatia is
particularly complex in that, because of its borderline position, every one of the used labels describes
only a part of its geo-political identity.
of two simplified topoi invoked in an almost caricatural way in the speeches of right-wing political figures during the authoritarian 1990s. These speeches reduced a set of complex historical developments to Croatia’s long-standing allegiance to the universalism of the Roman Catholic Church and to its role of the *antemurale christianitatis*, defending the West from the Ottoman menace. Among the elites educated in the socialist period, there was also a strong identification with Croatia’s European identity, but it was based on different premises. Its cornerstones were the analyses of cultural products, testifying to the presence on the Croatian soil of all major European historical styles and period traits in the fields of visual arts and literature. But such a European identification was also found among the population at large, especially at the outset of the 1991 war, as testified to by numerous records in the contemporary media discourse.

The pro-European enthusiasm was especially pronounced at the time of the breakup of Yugoslavia, but has later on abated somewhat in view of the perceived inefficiency and lack of initiative of the European Union in stopping the war in Croatia. Following that, in the 21st century, fears appeared that within the European Union framework, resources of the country would be “sold off” to European corporate capital. However, in spite of this, it can be said with great certainty that, in the sense of cultural self-identification of a large majority of Croats, there is hardly any alternative to adhering to the feeling of Croatia’s historical “European identity” and desiring its place “in Europe”. In such a construction of identity, the notion of the “Balkans” is actually seen as the “other” against which a “European” identity is created. It is felt to be an antithesis to “Europe” rather than a potential component of a possible dual identity, encompassing both the Balkans and Europe.

Viewed from this perspective, it is easy to understand the resistance to Croatia’s classification as a “Western Balkans” country. But the reasons for it sometimes appear to go beyond the cultural ones. They could perhaps be approximated by the following question: how can and why should a country aspiring to become a part of “Europe” be pushed towards what is perceived as its opposite, only to be integrated into an official European political, economic and legal framework at a later date, when those who are felt to be much less culturally, politically and economically ready for entry into the Union will be up to it?

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11 An historical overview of the topos of Croatia as *antemurale christianitatis* can be found in Žanić (2003). It is interesting to note that Tomašić (1997b, 100) wrote in the 1930s that this topos, alongside the ideas of martyrdom and an idealization of the past, represented the basis of the early “Croatian national mystique”. Its reappearance in the 1990s can be seen as another example of resurfacing of the structures of long duration in a contemporary context, at the moment of crisis and another attempt at fully-fledged national constitution.

12 For instance, since the 1970s, the Department of Comparative Literature at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb, made it a point to study Croatian literature in the “European context”, as reflected directly in the titles of some of its publications. The Department of Art History at the same faculty ran parallel courses in period styles for European and “national” art history, which also pointed out in a subtle way that these styles existed contemporaneously in Croatia.

13 The pro-European sentiment, as well as connotations of martyrdom necessary for Croats to become a part of Europe, can be said to have found a striking visual equivalent in a video-clip repeatedly shown at the outset of the 1991 war on national television. It showed a sequence of years and symbols put next to the word “Croatia”: in the segment that related to the year 1990, the symbol was composed of two red squares, denoting the achievement of Croatian national sovereignty; the year 1991 was accompanied by a red blot evoking the war experience by means of its association with explosion and blood; and finally, next to the year 1992 there were twelve European Union stars, as a symbol of Croatia’s desired and expected integration into “Europe”.

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The content of such a question would seem to suggest that there is also a set of political and economic reasons for the resistance to being stereotyped as part of the “Western Balkans”. At first glance, this set of reasons appears to be of more pragmatic nature, and to relate to a generally higher standard of living, higher economic promise and political stability of Croatia in relation to its immediate Eastern neighbors. If the promise of EU integration is economic development and political stability, then classified and “being pushed” into a closer association with less developed and politically less stable countries, could indeed seem to be unproductive in some respects, even if Croatia is singled out as a “leader” and an example of political transformation for the region. However, a more careful analysis would reveal that even statements of fact supporting the allegedly pragmatic resistance to the “Western Balkans” contextualization of Croatia are in reality culturally colored and primarily culturally motivated.

On the one hand, it is undeniable that the standard of living and, so to speak, “a general level of integration into the Western world” are higher in Croatia than not only in the neighbouring “Western Balkans” (i.e. former Yugoslav) countries, but also in the soon-to-be-EU-integrated former Soviet Bloc countries Bulgaria and Romania. On the other hand, though, it should be kept in mind that perceptions of Croatian cultural and economic superiority in the region significantly predate the current EU integration debate and even the bloody 1990s wars that preceded the current geo-political arrangements. They are by now deeply ingrained and difficult

14 For instance, it could be argued that close association with politically instable neighbours could make the country less attractive to the investors.

15 According to newspaper reports, at the time of writing of this essay, the citizens of the EU candidate country Bulgaria, expected to join the Union in 2007, had a half of the buying power of Croatian citizens, and an average income which amounted to less than a half of the Croatian. (One should bear in mind, though, that Croatian foreign debt is three times higher than Bulgarian, and comes close to the 85% of its Gross Domestic Product) As for the general integration into a value system consistent with that found in the economically advanced countries, diagrams based on Inglehart’s World Values Survey (Inglehart, 2000) seem to indicate a higher degree of integration than in the cases of either Bulgaria or Romania. When “self-expression” values are concerned, Croatia is grouped together with the countries such as Portugal and South Korea, followed in the descending order by Bosnia, and then Macedonia. Yugoslavia comes next, while Bulgaria and Romania trail behind it and form the final group of South-East European countries represented on the diagram. On Richard Florida’s nascent Global Creativity Index (Florida, 2005), conceived of as a composite measure of national competitiveness, Croatia ranks thirtieth and Bulgaria thirty-first, while Romania is the last, forty-fifth country to be included on the list. Other South-East European countries are not represented.

16 Paradoxically enough, these perceptions of Croatian cultural and economic superiority only began to develop once Croatia became a part of the South Slav state of Yugoslavia. Namely, for the most part of the 19th century, the majority of population living on the territories of present-day Croatia were under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and had no direct experience of being in the same administrative unit with the eastern parts of what after WWI became first the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and then the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ruled by the Serbian Karageorgevich dynasty. It goes without saying that cultural contacts and cultural stereotypes preceded this new life in the common state, but it is during the so called “first”, pre-WWII Yugoslavia that the basic stereotypical constellations confronting the Croats and the Serbs were established. Although there is no space here to discuss the topic in detail, it can be briefly said that the perceptions of Croatian cultural and economic superiority in the region have come about largely as a reaction to the perception of cultural crudity and economic opression that Croats claim to have experienced in the Serb-dominated royalist Yugoslavia. Without entering into a discussion of literary depictions of these stereotypes, extending from Rebecca West and Miroslav Krleža to the contemporary writers, it should be remarked that the central stereotypical elements seem to work on the both sides. For instance, it is interesting to note that a recent report on a survey of the national stereotypes in Serbia shows that Croats are seen as “insincere, cold, selfish, quarrelsome and dishonest, but also as clean, industrious, cultured and civilized” (Grujić, 2000).
to challenge by allegedly “rational” economic or political arguments, as are those laid out by the current EU leadership.\textsuperscript{17}

As important as they are, perceptions – ranging from those of the EU policy makers to those of Zagreb secondary school students\textsuperscript{18} - will not suffice to bring one closer to understanding the historical complexities of the multiple regional affiliations found on the territory of present-day Croatia and their reflection in the contemporary Croatian society. In order to achieve this understanding, a more complex cultural and social analysis is needed, preferrably based on empirical material.

In spite of the “static” and “reductionist” character of his model (Štulhofer, 1997, 199), and the accusation of its being based on “antiquated (at the time) ethnography and impressionistic travel accounts” (Flere, 2002), the mentioned Tomašić’s interwar writings (reprinted in 1997a, 1997 b) can still serve as a good starting point for more elaborate and up-to-date accounts. There are several reasons for that.

To begin with, Tomašić’s thesis firmly establishes the “Balkans” component of the Croatian culture, by making no secret that the cattle-breeding Dinaric cultural type is also found in it.\textsuperscript{19} This simple fact could still function as an important eye-opener to those in Croatia who still think that “Balkans is (exclusively) others”. Namely, if some European policy-makers need to find out that there is much more to Croatia than the Balkans, some Croats apparently still have to realize and accept the realization that a “Balkan element” is indeed present in their culture. Although other criteria could be used as well,\textsuperscript{20} Tomašić’s pre-WWII writings are arguably the most

\textsuperscript{17} In a historical context, this situation can again be seen as a resurfacing of the previously existing phenomena. According to Mlinarić’s comparative study of early modern cartography of the “Croatian Lands” (2002), European cartographers saw this area as a liminal space between Islam and Christianity, while the Croatian authors insisted on belonging to the Mediterranean and Northern, Christian cultural area that was later to become know as Central Europe. Mlinarić (2002, 142) also says that even when a Venetian subject was in an objectively more difficult position than an Ottoman one, Croats still hoped for Western rule. This situation can be seen as a parallel to the current Croatian prefference for the European (i.e. EU) as opposed to the Balkans contextualization of the country. Although the latter could be more profitable in the economic sense, the cultural allegiance to “Europe” proves again to have the upper hand.

\textsuperscript{18} A turn of the century survey of Zagreb high school students (Šakaja, 2002) has shown that negative perceptions of the “East” and especially the “Balkans” persist. Except for Greece, the countries of the “Balkans” are seen as the least attractive to live in, alongside with Russia, Bielorussia and Ukraine. The absolute champion of unattractiveness is Yugoslavia, and the only relatively acceptable countries of transition are those Central European ones (Slovenia, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary). Italy, on the other hand, was found to be the most desirable country to live in, for a number of reasons, among which are also those of its geographical and cultural proximity to Croatia, and especially to the way of life in the Croatian region of Dalmatia.

\textsuperscript{19} It was only in the post-WWII period that instances of what Bougarel (1998) terms “«ethnicisation » abusive de la réalité sociale et culturelle des sociétés balkaniques” appear in Tomašić’s writing, in sentences like the one describing the main source of the internal conflict of the interwar Yugoslavia as “essentially a struggle of the Zadruga peasantry against the Dinaric warriors who had imposed themselves upon Croatia as Serbian military” (Tomašić 1948: 204). His original “dual” model of the “social development of the Croats” clearly counts with the Dinaric component as part of the Croatian culture as well.

\textsuperscript{20} If the term “Balkans”, with its connotations of “general underdevelopment” and “non-European political practices”, is in Croatian colloquial usage frequently associated with “Turkish rule” in the neighbouring countries, a quote from the map of an early modern cartographer should suffice to remind the Croats of the periods of Turkish rule on the ethnically Croat territories. Mlinarić (2002, 137) states that Pierre Du Val in his 1663 map combines regional and political designations and therefore distinguishes between “Esclavonie l’Avstriche, Esclavonie av Tvrc, Croatie av Turc, Croatie l’Avstriche, Dalmatia a la Republique Venie [and] Dalmatie av Turc”. One of these expressions had become culturalized: Mlinarić (2002, 137) states that the region between the Vrbas and Una rivers (in
suitable introduction to the topic, because they are based on cultural analysis and come from a scholar certainly not uninformed about Croatian culture and certainly not perceived as hostile to it.

Secondly, it is also evident from Tomašić’s writings that the other component of his “dual model” (the agrarian collectivist one) should not be seen as straightforwardly “European”, but at best as a suitable precondition for integration into “Europe” imagined in terms of social justice and rational political rule. One should bear in mind that Tomašić actually extols an archaic model, whose peaceful and cooperative character he sets not only against the tribal, cattle-breeding cultural model found in the Dinara mountain range, but also against both Western feudalism and capitalism. Viewed from this perspective, neither of the components of Tomašić’s “dual” model of Croatian culture could serve as a basis for its “European” legitimation in relation to the cultures of its eastern neighbours. The tribal, Dinaric mentality he obviously looked down upon, while the cooperative agrarian model was obviously at odds with the requirements of a capitalist Europeanization.

This brings us to the final and most important reason that still makes Tomašić’s model a good starting point for a contemporary discussion of both the past and the present of Croatian culture. It is in that this model reveals a lot by what it omits: by filling in its absences one gets a more complex picture of the studied object and the role its components played in the setting up of its present profile.

The biggest, and at first glance almost incomprehensible, Tomašić’s omission is his neglect of the Mediterranean component of Croatian cultural identity. This omission is highly indicative, not only because agrarian collectivist model can also be found on the rural Croatian islands, as shown by Županov (2001), but because it points to a general weakness of Tomašić’s approach. A thesis could be put forth that his model only counted with a clear-cut opposition of two pristine cultural stereotypes, and was simply theoretically not sophisticated enough to account for the present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina) was referred to as “Turkish Croatia” (Türkisch Kroatien) all the way to the end of the 19th century, in spite of the changed political situation (Austrian rule) of the region at that time.

That it is indeed so can be said to have already been shown when at a very delicate moment, when the war in Croatia was far from ended, the sociologist Županov (1993) asked in an essay discussing Tomašić’s work whether the tribal Dinaric model could be associated exclusively with Serbian ethnos. Županov reaffirmed the existence of the “dual” model in the Croatian context and showed instances of the re-emergence of the Dinaric, tribal cultural model in it since 1941 to the present.

One could choose to believe with Tomašić that the emphasis on social justice in the politics of the pre-WWII Croatian Peasant Party could be seen as a contemporary manifestation of the model that he perceived as intrinsically “democratic”. But just as the party itself, the agrarian collectivist model was not unambiguously “European”: it would be more accurate to say that it showed a far greater potential to lead in a “European” modernization of the Croatian society then the circumstances of the “first” Yugoslavia would allow.

It is interesting to note in this regard that Živković (1997) mentions that “duality” Tomašić describes also exists in Serbian culture: peaceful lowlanders are set against combative highlanders in that context as well. According to Živković, the Serbian ethnogeographer Jovan Cvijić, who was also one of the six senior experts at the Paris Peace Conference at which the new South Slav state was established, extolled the character traits of the Dinaric mentality in order to “present[… a little known population to ‘civilized’ Europe in the most favorable light, and the most important thing was to present it as inherently capable of state-building.” Živković also quotes Dvorniković, “a very important but neglected student of Cvijić”, in order to illustrate Cvijić’s choice to extol the Dinaric mentality as well as “the prevalent characterizations of Slavs in the ‘civilized’ Europe at the time”. Dvorniković (1939, 141) said that Slavs were then perceived as being of “the dovish disposition” – peaceful, passive, and “non-statebuilding”. In contrast with Cvijić and his followers, Tomašić extolled exactly these character traits, according to him found in the agrarian, collectivist constituent of his “dual” model of Croatian culture.
numerous “contaminations” resulting from the historically rich intercultural contacts in the Adriatic region of Dalmatia.

Another possible explanation, related to the former but more mundane, is that Tomašić excluded a discussion of a potential Mediterranean, Dalmatian component of Croatian culture because of his political preferences. Namely, it could be argued that his entire model had largely been constructed in order to provide an explanation of the internal political conflicts of the “first”, royalist Yugoslavia. In this scheme, the Croats were seen first and foremost as the inheritors of the autochthonous cooperative cultural component. Dalmatian cities, on the other hand, were seen by Tomašić as “tribal and patriarchal element from the Dalmatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian mountains settled” (1997b, 93 [translation ours]), and together with the “remnants of Dalmatian feudalism” served as a basis for a “special Dalmatian regionalism”. Having been built on the tribal, i.e. Dinaric component of his model, and also containing the elements of Western (i.e. non-autochthonous) feudal culture, this Dalmatian “exceptionalism” obviously did not fit well enough into the scheme contrasting two clear-cut traditional oppositions, in which the contemporaneous Croatian political culture was seen as the inheritor of the more democratic one of the two.

Both of these hypotheses could also be applied to the omission of what according to Županov (1993) was the potential fourth cultural component of Tomašić’s model: the one applicable in the northwestern region of Zagorje, which was the only Croatian region in which developed feudalism of the Western type existed.

Whatever the reasons for both of these omissions, however, the absence of the Mediterranean component in Tomašić’s model seems to be particularly conspicuous, especially in view of the post-WWII construction of Croatian cultural identity, based largely on the European character of cultural artefacts found in the Dalmatian region, as well as on the civic traditions of its cities. What’s more, some of the components of contemporary Croatian cultural identity historically located in its Mediterranean part, most prominently in the city of Dubrovnik, make it an inheritor of the Renaissance culture, which according to Banac (1992) was not only rich but also unique in the entire Slav world.

Any equation expressing Croatia’s multiple regional affiliations and identities can therefore only be complete if the Mediterranean component is firmly anchored in it, just like in the quoted Dragojević’s definition. On the other hand, any attempt to pigeon-hole the Croatian culture and identity into any single one of its three most conspicuous components is bound to fail, whatever its motivation is and regardless

24 For example, according to the comprehensive empirical research of Vera St. Erlich, carried out in 1937, but widely read in the post-WWII Yugoslavia (Erlich, 1964), it turns out that Dalmatia and the region of the Adriatic coast to the northwest of it (“Upper Littoral”), in the strip “not more than five kilometers away from the sea” had by far the most modern profile among all the Croatian regions. According to Erlich, who studied the profile of various Croatian regions to a large detail, this minuscule littoral strip of land was “the earliest one to be included into monetary economy” and “under the strong and long-lasting Venetian and Austrian influences”. In a number of annotated translations of the statutes of the medieval Dalmatian municipal communes, the post-WWII historian of law Antun Cvitanić has shown an active reception in these communes of the 13th and 14th century interpretations of the Roman Law originating in Italy and what is today the South of France, mixed with the local legal traditions. Another law historian, Lujo Margetić, has researched in the same way the legal traditions on the north-western part of the Adriatic coast.
whether it comes from the part of the Croats or from foreign observers.\textsuperscript{25} Up to this date, Croatian culture has preserved its composite character: a continuous and intense interplay of its constituents could actually be said to represent its defining characteristic.

This composite character of Croatian culture, in which its regional constituents and affiliations are still clearly recognizable, could be interpreted at least partly as a consequence of until recently incomplete nation-building process as well as of a belated, incomplete and highly idiosyncratic modernization process. A brief discussion of these two elements will also bring us a step closer to understanding the complexities of contemporary Croatian identity.

Regarding the completeness of the nation-building process, it is obvious that Croatia belongs with the countries of the most recent wave of nation-building, i.e. of those whose full national sovereignty was secured not only after the Second World War, but only after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Although there exist those who claim that Croatia had retained elements of its “statehood” in 19\textsuperscript{th} century Austro-Hungarian Empire and 20\textsuperscript{th} century Yugoslavia, modern Croatia became a widely internationally recognized sovereign state only in 1992.\textsuperscript{26} It has therefore been only recently that the country acquired all the attributes of a sovereign nation and started to exert its powers in a fashion that older nation-states had begun to do decades or even centuries ago.

To take but one example, trends of centralization leading up to a purposeful minimization of regional identities as well as of the economic power of the regions were evident throughout the 1990s.\textsuperscript{27} Needless to say, such a strategy was bound and expected to reflect on the field of cultural development and identity formation. In other words, the administrative measures undertaken in the recent, postsocialist period of Croatian history can be said to have been aimed at the creation of as much as possible homogeneous, “non-hyphenated” Croatian national identity.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{25} During the 1990s, the official rhetoric of the circles close to President Tudjman can be said to have privileged the “Central European” identification of Croatia as the proof of its belonging to “Europe”. The current European political and journalistic discourses obviously privilege the “Western Balkans” identification, which frequently results in suprises of first-time visitors who encounter on the Croatian territory traces of artefacts and cultural traditions obviously at odds with the “Western Balkans” designation. To achieve a nuanced description of Croatian cultural identity, which would not clash with the really existing situation of its culture, foreign observers would be well-advised to take into account the complexities of the interplay of its numerous facets. Croatian scholars, on the other hand, would be well-advised to undertake research of the cultural tradition of various Croatian regions from a post-colonial perspective, which is currently still missing in the contemporary Croatian humanities and social sciences. Such a perspective would, namely, reveal new complexities of cultural hybridization where now one can mostly find large brushstroke accounts of “foreign domination” in the past.

\textsuperscript{26} Croatian right-wing politicians in the 1990s invoked the Independent State of Croatia, instituted and backed by Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, as a brief but nevertheless important precedent for a sovereign Croatian state. However, the fact remains that in addition to its ideological illegitimacy this state was only recognized by the Axis powers and their satellites. Present-day Croatia, according to its constitution is built on the anti-Fascist heritage and fully recognized as an independent country by the international community.

\textsuperscript{27} In this period, political and economic centralization of Croatia was achieved, among other things, by the administrative division of the country into small, historically illogical units called counties, dependent on the centralized distribution of money and unable to develop regional projects, or - still worse - unable to keep the profits generated by them even if such projects were successful. Such administrative division of the country has not been amended to this day. However, certain changes in this regard are expected to happen in the process of European integration of the country.

\textsuperscript{28} It should be said that the term «hyphenated» is used here metaphorically, by analogy to its use in the U.S.-American context, to express the feeling of dual allegiance that post-«melting pot» Americans have with regard to their ethnic heritage and national belonging. To avoid any misunderstanding, it should be made clear that such a dual feeling of belonging was in the Croatian 1990s never distilled to
While this is not unlike what older nation-states had been doing at the equivalent level of their historical development, the specificity of the current Croatian situation is due to the fact that its sovereign nationhood has been acquired in the historical context in which the nation-state is being transcended at the European level. Since the beginning of integration into the European framework at the end of the 1990s, and especially after the fully-fledged candidacy and opening of the negotiations in 2005/2006, the currently still centralized administrative model has begun to meet with the regional emphasis of the European policy making, both at the supra-national and intra-national levels. In terms of cultural identity formation and social development in general, it will be highly interesting to observe the emerging conflict of these two essentially opposed approaches. Likewise, it will be interesting to monitor the development of nowadays still only nascent but nevertheless already publicly perceived reemergence of the elements of local and regional awareness, currently conceived more in economic than in political or cultural terms.  

Paradoxically enough, then, the administrative aspect of the 1990s attempts to homogenize the national cultural identity has in effect created a solid ground for the affirmation and implementation of a different regional differentiation of the country. This differentiation can be expected to begin in administrative terms, in the process of integration of the country into the European Union. Riding the wave of EU policy preferences, these administrative changes and political concepts connected with them are bound to have some cultural consequences, just as the homogenizing tendencies of the 1990s have left some trace in the current perceptions of the contemporary

such a degree it would warrant a formal phrase in either official or colloquial use. Instead, as has been said earlier, the mainstream feeling of being ethnically Croat or belonging to the Croatian nation (which had been formed in the cultural sense of the word in the late 19th century but without the attributes of the nation-state) has in its modern history always been complemented by easily recognizable regional dialectal and cultural identities in a more informal way. In other words, while it is completely logical that Croatian emigres feel as «Croatian-Americans» in the United States, in the Croatian context one is «Croatian» but also dialectally and behaviourally obviously «Slavonian» or «Dalmatian», without the need to unite these components into phrases such as «Slavonian-Croatian» or «Dalmatian-Croatian». These would be alien in contemporary Croatian usage.  

What little exists of the regional political awareness can be interpreted largely as a reaction to the highly centralized system of government that has not been reformed by the post-Tudjman governments (neither by the first post-Tudjman center-left coalition-government nor the current one headed again by the reformed Tudjman’s Croatian Democratic Union), and especially to the economic imbalances that it has created. The first more significant opposition to the centralizing trends is currently felt mostly at the city level, where mayors and city administrations complain about the impossibility of governing independently at the local level. The capital city of Zagreb, in addition to being economically privileged is also felt to be politically privileged because of its special territorial status which gives its mayors the powers that secure independence in political action. Economic imbalances in Croatia are of such magnitude that the advisors of international financial organizations are currently urging the government to reform. For instance, the press has widely reported that a recent World Bank survey has found out that the buying power of the citizens of the capital city is 80% higher from the Croatian average. For the time being, the rising dissatisfaction in the regions is mostly expressed at the media level and rarely finds translation into parliamentary discussions. The only notable exception are the politicians from the region of Istria who have recurrently been bringing up the quest for more regional autonomy since Tudjman’s time. The Istrian case also seems to be the only one in which the cultural component has been present as well.  

As this text is being written, the discussion on how to regionally restructure the country is under way. The Croatian negotiators insist that it be divided into two statistical regions (“Adriatic” and “Continental”), while Eurostat is providing statistical data for four Croatian regions. Inside Croatia, there is a fear that the division into two statistical regions would again benefit the capital city of Zagreb, which on its own does not qualify for pre-accessions funds because its GDP is above three quarters of the European average.
Croatian identity. However, one should bear in mind that the acceleration of history that a belated nation-building process brings about in present-day circumstances obviously entails a culture lag. Because of the time needed for social and cultural adaptation to the new social, political, and administrative realities, it is hard to predict what forms and direction the new cultural identities of Croatian citizens will take both in the short and in the long run. These identities are bound to be composite, as has been the case in the past, but the content and proportions of their individual constituents only the future can show.

In contrast with that, turning to the other subject of discussion, which is the nature and the consequences of the belated and idiosyncratic process of modernization in Croatia, we are again forced to turn to the past, almost all the way back to Tomašić’s pristine cultural types mentioned in the first part of this essay, or at least to the social, cultural and political context in which they came about as an intellectual construction. Again, Tomašić’s original model and approach reveal a lot by what they are omitting.

Writing about both Tomašić’s model and those who used some of its elements to account for contemporary events, Bougarel (1998) says that in addition to some historical complexities Tomašić “omet également de prendre en compte les processus de modernisation socio-économique, politique et culturelle auxquels cette région du monde n’a évidemment pas échappé”. According to the same author, contemporary analyses based on Tomašić’s work also fail to take into account the imbalances and contradictions that the Yugoslav space has encountered after the year 1945 during an extremely rapid modernization process.  

And indeed, if one would want in any way to bring into connection Tomašić’s pre-WWII descriptions of the “social development of the Croats” with the contemporary developments in the Croatian society, as we are in some respects tempted to do, one should by all means attempt to include an account of the nature of the modernization process in one’s explanations. Fortunately, in our case we are not only taking the complexities of this modernization process into account but are basing on them our explanation of what we take to be a distinguishing characteristic of the present-day Croatian society.

Based on the empirical research of women and youth in Croatia at the turn of the century (Tomčić-Koludrović and Kunac, 2000; Tomić-Koludrović and Leburić, 2001) and the subsequent interpretation of the results of that research, the thesis that contemporary Croatian society is characterized by a simultaneous evolvement of two modernization processes of different natures and levels of intensity has been put forth by one of the authors of this essay. Despite that, it was not highlighted as their central thesis, this thesis was put forth by Inga Tomić-Koludrović in the interpretive part of the quoted books as well as in several other subsequent articles.  

31 Bougarel is writing about those who interpreted the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia as a “revenge of the villagers” to the “urban population”, but his insight can be applied in other domains as well. To provide an illustration of the abruptness and rapidity of modernization, i.e. de-agrarization of the Croatian society in the post-WWII period, one can quote the data on the share of the agrarian population in it. In 1945 it amounted to 75-80% of the population, in 1961 to 43.6%, in 1971 to 29.1%, in 1981 it was 15.2%, and in 1991 merely 9.1% (Županov 2001a, 34).

32 Although it was not highlighted as their central thesis, this thesis was put forth by Inga Tomić-Koludrović in the interpretive part of the quoted books as well as in several other subsequent articles.
the country. This segment of the modernization process has left a particular bearing on its present and is closely connected with the discussion of the components of present-day Croatian cultural identity.

As has already been briefly stated, the description of Croatian society as a society simultaneously affected by the work of two modernization processes of different characters is based on Ulrich Beck’s distinction between the “first” and “second” modernity, put forth for the first time in his groundbreaking book on the “risk society” (1987). In brief, what Beck refers to as “first” or “simple” modernity is typical of industrial society and the social change it brought about in relation to pre-industrial social institutions. This “first” modernity has affected various aspects of social organization, but never so radically as its upgraded version promises to do. Namely, this “second” modernity, underway in the countries with advanced (post)industrial economies, is attempting to modernize its own foundations by rethinking them in the new circumstances (hence the adjective “reflexive” in Beck’s alternative label for it).

According to Beck, “second” modernity is directed at everything that “first” one has left “unmodernized”: family and gender roles, workplace relations, individual biographies and sense of belonging. Central to it is the process of individualization, forcing social actors to question and reflect upon all the basic assumptions, limitations, and contradictions of modernity. This thinking through is done at an individual level, in a “risk society” context, where everybody is forced to make decisions, increasingly without resort to the disappearing traditional collective support mechanisms, ranging from the family to the nation-state. Consequently, the societies faced with “second modernity” are marked by an increase in post-traditional forms of social organization, which obviously include an ever-increasing number of people living by themselves, as well as tolerance for alternative lifestyles.

In its crudest form, Beck’s thesis on the different natures of the first and second modernity could be applied to Croatian society by saying that, in terms of values and cultural identities, it simultaneously exhibits characteristics typical of a society moving from pre-industrial to industrial period, but also – to a much lesser degree – of the process that can be referred to as the “post-industrial modernisation” of society. What differentiates it from the former “real socialist” countries in this respect is that the existence of “postmaterialist values”, which Inglehart holds to be an indicator of a technologically and economically developed society, was recorded in it already in the socialist times. In other words, in the Croatian case, as well as in the

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33 Rogić (2000; 2001) speaks of the “three modernizations” of Croatian society. According to this author, the “first modernization” came about in the period between 1868 and 1945, the “second” in the period between 1946 and 1990, and the “third” in the post-1990 period. In our view, these are all segments and different guises of the same modernization process, which in Beck’s terminology could all be classified as “first modernity” phenomena. However, this remark taken into account, we find Rogić’s periodization useful because it enables us to concentrate on a highly idiosyncratic segment of the “first modernity” changes that took place in the socialist period of Croatian history. It should also be noted that, in contrast with Rogić’s periodization, Županov (2001a, 17) claims that the process of industrialization (and consequently of modernization) had without any doubt began in Croatia already in the first half of the 19th century.

34 The basic principles of Inglehart’s research of values were outlined thirty years ago, in his The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in Advanced Industrial Society (1977). They have continued to this day. Beside the author’s more recent books and articles, they include empirical research within a comprehensive World Values Survey.

35 The results of a large-scale empirical survey of Yugoslav youth carried out in 1986 indicated that the youth populations of Slovenia and Croatia consistently exhibited individualist values (Ule 1988: Radin, 1990). The findings of this survey were confirmed by another survey carried out in 1988 (Ule, 1989).
Slovenian case and in the case of some urban centers elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, “post-materialist” values can be said not to have been only something that – then undreamt of - capitalist future would bring about. They were already developed in some strata of the population in the decade before the fall of the Berlin Wall, making parts of the constituents of the former Yugoslavia comparable in certain respects with their Western counterparts.

Generally speaking, the existence of post-materialist values at some locations and in some strata of the population (most conspicuously the youth) in the late period of the socialist Yugoslavia can be attributed to this country’s larger degree of openness to the West and higher living standards that it enjoyed in comparison with the “real socialist” states of the Soviet bloc. Since his break with Stalin in 1948, Tito had namely been balancing carefully between the two blocks and two ideological systems, creating his version of what was known as “socialism with a human face”.

In this place it is perhaps not out of the way to remark that Yugoslavia, and with it Croatia, was a country with an atypical system for real-socialism, with a growing openness to the import of Western cultural products, deriving from as far back as the 1950s, and with elements of consumerism dating from the 1960s. In the sixties, the tourist industry, concentrated on the Croatian coast, experienced its first boom, bringing the country into even more contacts with the West. The sixties also saw the first contingents of guest workers leave for Germany: these people were bringing back to their rural settings in the hinterland not only hard currency but also Western products and information on what the society looked like where they were working. Likewise, it should also not been forgotten that, unlike in the real socialist countries, since the 1960s, the overwhelming majority of Yugoslav citizens could freely travel abroad.

It is also important to note that, in the sphere of the production of meaning, the Western influences in the socialist Yugoslavia were not limited only to the media and popular culture, as largely seems to be the case with the countries opening to these influences only in the postsocialist period. In the then ideologically important domain of the high arts, there existed a large degree of compatibility with the artistic trends in the post-WWII West, extending back almost all the way to the beginning of the socialist period. Figuratively speaking, at the time when “socialist realism” was still the official doctrine in the socialist states of the Soviet bloc, in Croatia one could already find examples of abstract expressionism. Such a state of affairs had continued all the way to the transitional period, unlike in the other former socialist states.

The northern Serbian province of Vojvodina and the city of Belgrade were also noted as places where there existed a pronounced distance to the authoritarian collectivist paradigm.

This period and these phenomena have as yet not been extensively studied in scholarly fashion in Croatia. Only recently, in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century, a number of publications have appeared - ranging from newspaper articles to exhibition catalogues and scholarly monographs - that attempt to shed more light on these phenomena and put them into the context of contemporary Croatian history. However, more comprehensive scholarly syntheses of the period in question are still missing.

The first abstract expressionist exhibition in Croatia, entitled “Impressions of America” and painted by Edo Murtić, was organized in 1953. This was also the year of the first Croatian public show of the group of architects and designers “Exat 51”. A year earlier, the “Ljubljana paper” of the Croatian writer and prominent political figure Miroslav Krleža, announced an end of the aesthetic of “socialist realism” in literature.

It has already been mentioned that the examples of architectural and artistic styles from all the periods of Western art since the medieval days to the twentieth century can be find on the territory of the present-day Croatia. The same can be said for the contemporary, post-WWII art: all major styles
But the convergence with the Western practices was by no means confined to the sphere of the arts. In the second half of the 1970s, in general approach to social life and attitude towards the role of the welfare state in particular, there was a significant convergence with the situation in the social democratic countries of the period. This was the period when whatever existed of the “post-materialist” values in Croatia and in the former Yugoslavia was forged. Again, one should note, this happened roughly in the period when such tendencies were beginning to be felt in the West to such a degree that they became an object of social research.\(^{39}\)

It was on this cultural and social capital that one of the most visible indicators of the post-materialist values of the period came to being: a zestful youth pop culture, which reflected a general rise of production standards in all activities connected with arts and the media. In addition to the mentioned convergence with the Western social-democratic practices of the period, there was – in the second half of the 1980s – also a gradual rise in tolerance of principles that can be considered part of the liberal heritage. This had continued until the disintegration of Yugoslavia, making media in this period more accessible for public debate then they can be said to at present, in the period when Croatia is approaching the EU and when media ownership is largely in foreign hands.\(^{40}\)

However, in spite of all this, one should not forget that the “human”, gradually ever more “Westernized”, face of Yugoslav socialism had always had a more or less visible repressive partner. In its initial phase, the leadership of the Communist Party had attempted to actively stamp out the tenets of the middle class tradition that had survived the turmoil of revolution. Later, in the more “liberal” period, especially in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s, one should not lose sight of the fact that so-called “self-managing” socialism was based on a system in which numerous elements of a pre-modern and practically feudal organisation of society were inherent. It was a system that, regardless of its proclaimed modernization ideals and achieved technological standards of an industrial society, in effect exhibited premodern traits (Ule, 1989, 30) and stimulated specific forms of feudalization of society (Tomić-Koludrović, 1992, 24).

Namely, every social position in this society was determined by numerous formal and informal privileges of the ruling Communist Party members, and the administrative system rested on a non-transparent and elaborate ritualization of social relations which inevitably led to a completely “political production” of everyday life (Puhovski 1990, 38). In theory, different “self-managing interests” were supposed to be voiced, but only within the “frame of reference of the dominant legitimacy” (Goati 1979, 30), or in other words the agenda set by the Communist Party, which was in effect the only political organization wielding real power, in spite of the existence of several other parapolitical associations whose role was to create an impression of plurality and to reinforce the central role of the “Party”.\(^{41}\) One of the key traits of the

\(^{39}\) As has already been mentioned, Ronald Inglehart’s book that started the discussion that has continued to this day was published in 1977.

\(^{40}\) We have argued this and provided examples to substantiate the claim in Petrić and Tomić-Koludrović (2006).

\(^{41}\) Although in colloquial language it continued to be referred to simply as “the Party”, the Communist Party of Croatia was in fact renamed into “League of Communists” in 1952. In addition to it, there were several other parapolitical organizations, whose designated role was to represent the interests of
version of Yugoslav socialism introduced in the second half of the 1970s was avoidance of social conflict, which in itself can be seen as an attempt to avoid the introduction of a truly pluralist, Western-style parliamentary political system.\textsuperscript{42}

All of this meant that, when the socialist system came to an end at the turn of the 1980s into 1990s, Croatian and Yugoslav citizens in general, were ill-prepared for both the capitalist economy and Western-style parliamentary democracy. This was so in spite of the experience of Western post-WWII culture that other socialist countries had not had, and partial convergence with some phenomena and values typical of that culture. These resemblances, however, have proved to have been superficial: they were manifested in certain cultural phenomena, while the corresponding political and economic undercurrents were deeply incompatible with their Western counterparts. Admittedly, they were incompatible in a somewhat different way than was the case with the other postsocialist transitional societies, but still to such a degree which - with the notable exception of Slovenia\textsuperscript{43} – made a relatively smooth integration into the current Western political and economic structure impossible.

In the Croatian case, as in the case of the most other countries of former Yugoslavia, this integration was not made easier by the wars of Yugoslav succession. But the national homogenization and re-traditionalization of the society which is one of its obvious consequences cannot explain everything.\textsuperscript{44} In order to understand the perplexing present, in which whatever is left from the post-material values of the 1980s is mingled with the remnants of post-war authoritarianism and the codes of the 1990s transitional capitalism, one has again to look back even more deeply into the socialist past.

We have already stated that the transitional extension of the bundle of contradictions on which the Yugoslav socialist system rested can in the Croatian case be arguably best understood if one adopts the theory about the simultaneous evolvement in the Croatian society of two modernization processes. That the processes’ characteristics of the first, “simple”, modernity were so pronounced in the initial transitional period was certainly due to the belated nation-building and the war

\textsuperscript{42} It could be argued that this type of avoidance of conflict can be related to the tradition of cooperative agrarian collectivity described by Tomašić as one of the two types making up his “dual” model of Croatian culture. Županov (2001a, 20) has argued that, in the economic sphere, this meant that instead of “capital societies” (Gesellschaft), the 1970s Yugoslav economic system introduced “associations of associated labour” (ie. a kind of pseudo-Gemeinschaft).

\textsuperscript{43} The differences between the Slovenian transition and the transition processes in the other former Yugoslav republics have unfortunately not become an object of systematic study. Deploring the lack of even hypothetical papers on the topic, Županov (2001a, 24) claims that it would be highly interesting to study the different transition paths of Slovenia and Croatia, the countries that have entered the transition process from a comparable economic position.

\textsuperscript{44} Bougarel (1998) turns our attention to the fact that the process of retraditionalization of the societies that made up Yugoslavia can actually be said to have been under way since the 1960s, as a result of the imbalances brought about by the modernization process. This process had found expression in the renewal of the nationalist ideologies and communitarian practices in the political life of Yugoslavia. In other words, retraditionalization cannot be said to be the phenomenon characteristic of the war-ridden 1990s, when it erupted with previously unseen force. Bougarel mentions that the phenomenon of retraditionalization had been mentioned by the Croatian sociologist Josip Županov since 1970 and was then studied at some length in his study on the social power in the Yugoslav system of self-managing socialism (1985).
context in it which took place. But at least to the similar degree, they were also due to the fact that the modernization that unfolded in the socialist time was atypical and incomplete.

Various authors have described the nature of Yugoslav socialist modernization by the lapidary use of revealing labels, such as “pseudo-modernization”, “partial modernization”, and “semi-modernity”. In addition to diagnosing its incompleteness, the description of it as a “paradoxical modernization” (Rogić, 2001, 54), puts into the forefront what we hold to be its central contradiction: the attempt to achieve the effects of what is essentially a bourgeois modernization of society in the process characterized by an effort to actively stamp out the middle class and its values. Or, in a handy quote from another scholar, “Socialist industrialization was conceived of as development of industrialism and urbanism minus individualism, private property and market competition, a modernization based on socialist collectivism and state (‘social’) ownership” (Colic-Peisker, 2000, 161).

To be completely precise, it should be said that market mechanisms did exist in the former Yugoslavia to a much higher degree than elsewhere in the socialist world, but that in effect only their “distributive” and not their possible “allocative” functions were stimulated (Županov, 2001a, 20). In other words, the market of goods and services was considered acceptable, but not the market of labour and capital. However, as we have already said and as Županov lapidary puts it, “selective ‘import’ and cultural redesign of the elements of culture (economic, political, cultural, etc) from the West” (2001a, 20) served as a substitute for what was not there in the really existing life of society. On this basis, whatever existed in Croatia of the “post-materialist” and individualist values came to being, at the end of the socialist period, in the late 1970s and 1980s.

In the process of transition and the wars of Yugoslav succession, many elements of these values were lost, but it is interesting to note that whatever has been preserved of them has been limited to the cultural sphere. Empirical research of women and young people indicates that “post-materialist” and “individualist” values can be found in free time activities, but not really in the professional world or in the family.

In the transitional context, certain individualism appeared in the economic sphere, but was of course not individualism typical of “second modernity” and based on any sort of “post-materialist” values. Rather, it is what Beck (1993) terms Armuts-Individualisierung (individualization induced by poverty), based on the wish to differentiate oneself from others on the basis of possession of material goods, and found in the context of the rudimentary transition capitalism. This kind of individualization in itself can be seen as making up for the part of what was missing in economic terms in the unfinished socialist modernization, but also as an index of the “first modernity” processes ongoing in Croatian society, together with a set of the nation-building phenomena typical of the Croatian 1990s.

It is almost as if Tomašić’s pre-WWII contrasting “tribal” and “agrarian cooperative” types have come to life again, this time in the guise of those who stand for “state-building” and “early capitalist” values and those who opt for “European” values.45 The latter can be said to be currently outnumbered by the former, but it can

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45 In a twist of irony, Tudjman’s official rhetoric in the 1990s was full of praise for the “state-building” qualities of Croats, in the same way as Cvijić praised these qualities of the Dinaric population at the time of creation of the “first”, royalist Yugoslavia. Viewed through Cvijić’s or Tomašić’s optics, it can be conceded that the provenance of the political, military, and economic lobbies prominent in Tudjman’s 1990s Croatia was also largely Dinaric (Herzegovinian). These lobbies were not looking
be realistically expected that in the course of EU integration processes they will gain a somewhat more firm ground to stand on, not only in the ideological but also in legal and even financial terms.\textsuperscript{46}

To be sure, this process is certain not to be straightforward and can be expected to encounter numerous complications. To begin with, one should not lose sight of the fact that institutional changes, dictated in very great measure by EU integration process, are unfolding at great velocity, with which the really existing country and culture cannot entirely keep pace. In the same way as socialist modernization was “paradoxical” and incomplete, this next modernizing step can also be expected to create certain inconsistencies, if nothing else noticeable culture lags of social and cultural institutions which will simply have to catch up with projected changes of the legal, economic and political framework.

In many ways, the country is only now about to face what the current “new” EU members faced in the initial postsocialist period, when their – slow – accession processes began. This was a sort of collectivist, nationalist reaction to “global” trends that Beck (1994) diagnosed at the time when Croatia and the neighbouring countries were still involved in the wars of Yugoslav succession. At the same time, although Croatia is bound to find itself in structurally comparable constellations, it should not be forgotten that its population brings into them a different social and cultural capital, as well as that it is happening at a globally different historical moment.

Nevertheless, based on the experience of what are now new EU member states, what can be expected in Croatia in near future, at least as a temporary phenomenon, is a nostalgic remembrance of the idealized principles of social organization in the socialist past. These idealized memories are bound to include “[n]ation state society, collective patterns of life, full employment society and rapid industrialization with the ‘unseen’ exploitation of nature”\textsuperscript{47}, in short numerous elements that Beck summarizes as typical of “first modernity”. In other words, while EU integration process can be seen at the individual level as conducive to a set of values resembling those that were considered “post-materialist” in the late socialist period, at the collective level it can revive and reinforce elements of “simple modernity”.

In the same way as it is hard to predict what direction is the sense of regional cultural affiliation going to take under the influence of EU legislation, it is not easy to make out how the newly formed bundle of contradictory elements of “first” and “second” modernity is going to be disentangled in the future. However, what is quite certain – as has already been remarked in this essay - is that the period of initial “transition” has been completed, and that the newly formed social arrangements have

\textsuperscript{46} One of the first forms of European integration that has achieved significant public visibility in Croatia has been Croatia’s participation in the “Bologna Process” of the reform of higher education and the tutorial Tempus program associated with it. In the future, more programs of comparable public visibility can be expected.

\textsuperscript{47} This lapidary characterization applicable to the societies of the post-socialist, “transitional” countries has been taken from an interview with Beck conducted by Danilo Zolo. The original article was published in \textit{Reset} No. 53 (March-April 1999), and is now available in Italian and English at <http://dex1.tsd.unifi.it/juragentium/en/index.htm?surveys/wlgo/beck.htm> [visited September 17, 2006].
stabilized to such a degree that it is hard to call them transitional any longer. The division into rich and poor, losers and winners, “first modernity” values of mainstream society and its tiny “reflexively modernized” edge with post-middle-class values, is going to mark social processes in Croatia in the time to come as well.

The question is how to briefly describe this “post-transitional” society? Given the simultaneous existence of the elements of “first” and “second” modernity in the same social space, it seems to us that it would be most appropriate to label it as “mixed”, by analogy with the connotations of the terms such as “mixed economy” or “mixed agriculture”.

In a larger picture, such a label seems to us to be suitable as a description of the central distinguishing characteristic of the societies that had been until recently referred to as “transitional” in general. Namely, all these societies at present seem to exhibit simultaneously the characteristics of both traditional and modern social structures, since they have all experienced both a measure of relapse into traditionalism as a response to the globalizing trends and at the same time a certain adoption of the values and lifestyles that these globalizing trends bring with them. Likewise, while the adjective “transitional” carried connotations of a radical break in the recent past and a movement towards something different to the previously existing situation, the adjective “mixed” obviously relates to the outcome of a process and as such captures better the current “posttransitional mood”.

However, in the Croatian case the term “mixed society” can be said to carry an additional connotation, a nuance that distinguishes it both from the “postindustrially modernized” societies and from the neighbouring countries that have not yet formalized their EU accession process to the same degree as Croatia has. The adjective “mixed” in general emphasizes the existence of combined features or constituents in the same frame of reference, but in the Croatian case we see it also as carrying the connotations of certain inconsistency or incompatibility of elements, implied by phrases such as “mixed feelings”. Unlike Croatian cultural identity, that we have referred to as “composite” (i.e. made up of distinct regional constituents), its “mixed” society in different individual case blends in different measure the elements of “first” and “second” modernity into specific, idiosyncratic amalgams.

This does not go only for larger social configurations: empirical research indicates that the elements of two modernities are frequently amalgamated at the individual level, i.e. within one and the same person. Exactly this can be said to be an indicator of Croatian specificity in comparison with the social contexts it can otherwise be easily compared to.

An interpretation of the results of recent empirical research of values, carried out for Inglehart’s World Values Survey, shows that in a country significantly more than...
“postindustrially modernized” than Croatia is, there also concurrently exist elements of traditional and modern social structures. However, in contrast with Croatia, they are clearly discernible and represented in different segments of the sample. The specificity of the Croatian case, as has been said on other occasions and as has been proved in this case as well, is that elements of “first” and “second” modernity very frequently coexist amalgamated within the same person.

When compared with the other former Yugoslav countries, the situation is complex as well. Slovenia, with which Croatia shared “post-materialist” values in the important youth population segment at the end of the 1990s, seems to have moved – at least when young people are concerned – in the direction of a postindustrially modernized society to the degree Croatia has not achieved yet. On the other hand, on the basis of observation and analysis of cultural phenomena and media products in the post-Yugoslav countries east of Croatia, it can be said that “postmaterialist values” are represented in these countries to a lesser degree than is still the case in Croatia, despite the setbacks these type of values have obviously experienced during the war-ridden transitional decade of the 1990s.

Croatia has, then, again found itself between the two worlds, in concert with its traditional geopolitical position and historical legacies connected with it. Concluding this essay, we would like to suggest again that, in the years to come, the relations between the ingredients of its mixed society will be most effectively studied if viewed through the optics of the concurrent work of two modernization processes amid which it has found itself. We maintain that it is so, because the current contradictory situation of the country is likely to continue into the future and in fact get reinforced by the current political trends.

Namely, it can indeed be expected that “first modernity” trend will be fuelled by the expected reactive nostalgia for the security collective actors offered in the socialist past and by the still living “state-building” expectations of those sizeable segments of the ethnic Croatian population who have immigrated from the neighbouring former Yugoslav countries with significantly less developed post-materialist trends in the socialistic period. On the other hand, individualist and “post-materialist” trends will doubtless be promoted in the course of the European integration processes and by virtue of the symbolic hegemony these trends now enjoy in the media, unlike in the previous decade. The emerging relation could be

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51 Similar results were obtained by the empirical surveys of women and youth analyzed in Tomić-Koludrović and Kunac (2000) and Tomić-Koludrović and Leburić (2001).

52 According to the official data quoted in Bokulić (2006), in the course of the fifteen years of the Croatian state, a total of 1.15 million persons have acquired Croatian citizenship. This citizenship is granted primarily on the basis of ethnic belonging to the Croatian nation (ius sanguinis). Based on this principle roughly 800.000 persons from Bosnia and Herzegovina have obtained it, as well as 93.000 from Serbia and Montenegro, 18.000 from Slovenia and 14.000 from Macedonia. In addition to this, there have been 10.000 requests for Croatian citizenship from Germany, 3.500 from Italy, 3.000 from Australia, 2.000 from Argentina, 1.600 from Canada and 1.500 from Chile. Although it could be argued that the immigrants from the developed European countries or from Canada and Australia could actually bring in “post-materialist” and “individualist” values, it should not be forgotten that some Croatian diasporic communities have by their cultural profile stopped somewhere between their village and “the global village”, as Bougarel (1998) says about the members of the Herzegovinian diaspora who have financed Croatian armed forces during the 1990s wars.

53 The hegemony of a certain agenda in the symbiotic space can be hypothesized to be an important factor in the process of forging “individualist” and “post-materialist” values, in the same way as it has proved to be important in the war-ridden 1990s. If it was not so, a question could be asked: where did the post-materialist values of the Croatian 1980s youth disappear in the subsequent decade? In spite of the occasional alarming media reports on the extent of the brain drain of the educated youth population,
described in terms of a simple statement of the mixture of “traditional” and “modern” elements rather than in terms of simultaneous evolvement of two modernization process, but we feel that such a description would not do justice to the Croatian situation. If this essay has managed to offer a glimpse into why we think this is so, it has managed to fulfill its basic task.

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both academic treatises and official data seem to contradict such reports (cf. Adamović and Mežnarić 2003), especially when compared with the other transitional countries. In addition to the dramatic war events and economic hardship, and other factors that have tipped the balance in the direction different from that taken in the 1980s, the role of the media seems to be of high importance. As in the 1990s they fuelled the “state-building”cause, at the beginning of the 21st century, an important segment of the media pushes for the European integration and for the values it brings with it (Petrić and Tomić-Koludrović, 2006).

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